Twitter: @igorsushko / Email: igor.sushko@protonmail.com
First, please watch this video in which I demystify & explain the origins of the FSB letters from the Wind of Change to Vladimir Osechkin. This information will arm you with the right prism through which to view & interpret all of the #FSBletters.
My translation of the 12th #FSBletters from the #WindofChange inside the FSB to Vladimir Osechkin. Dated 3/26 - TODAY. Please share far & wide.
I will add clarification comments inside parenthesis where necessary. Let's start:
[PORTION REDACTED]
“… amount of blatantly fake intel dumps within the FSB has increased drastically in order to try to catch the leakers (#WindOfChange & others).
The leaks are very problematic (for the FSB): every serious businessman, politician, retiree, or dedicated penetrator has channels for getting information, so the Service's excitement is understandable. (This means the FSB is leaking like a sieve now - in all directions & to everyone)
For this reason, I cannot yet convey the information that needs to be conveyed (because that could risk #WindofChange being identified). In a nutshell, we are tearing our way to a new level of insanity. Everything is bad.
The main points about events that I can & should relay:
Bortnikov (Head of the FSB) managed to misdirect/deflect the brunt of criticism away from the FSB. Now the main culprit is Shoigu – if it were not for his catastrophic military miscalculation, then … (the Russian position wouldn’t be this dire in Ukraine). This view is now supported by many people on all sides.
Now the only chance for the FSB [or its leadership] to survive – provide the necessary facts about the high-ranking enemies in the country. (To place blame for the failures in this war, like it was done with Shoigu)
The Communist Party & especially their regional representatives, very high-ranking government officials, individual elected representatives, including those in the Duma (The Russian parliament) – they’re being targeted (to blame) with a level of intensity never seen before. And that was already being done before, albeit pre-emptively. Exposing of the powerful players who aim to overthrow the government should become a trend. “Enemies (of Putin) have already surrounded the Kremlin, if we don’t do this, the country will perish.” That’s the outlook.
War-time psychosis is growing into war-time lunacy. I don’t have an explanation for the dominant certainty among the leadership (not just in the FSB) that bets on military escalation will yield a positive outcome.
The thinking is that the West started a war against Russia,
and so counter-offensive measures are needed in search of a compromise. And the
saber-rattling has its own logic: If the military situation on the borders is
inflamed (by Russia, raise tension) then even an accidental or an entirely
localized incident can lead to the military to respond based on established
protocols & instructions. (On Russian borders with countries beside Ukraine)
One accidental & small incident will be enough to lead to a large-scale conflict, and “who started it” will be impossible to figure out. In all, the “Gordian Knot” (see #FSBletters #6) is becoming more & more relevant & realistic against the backdrop of the changing events.
Armenia – a terrorist threat, presumably – one of the Orthodox churches in Gyumri. Two options: a bloody terrorist attack on civilians, the rapid arrest of [our] perpetrators, who must have an Azerbaijani-Ukrainian connection (to blame Ukraine for the attack). A Turkish-Kosovo trail is very desirable as well.
This will allow:
- To politically block Azerbaijan's offensive potential in
Karabakh due to the almost complete transfer of our peacekeepers (#WindofChange
is being sarcastic in this reference to the Russian military) to Ukraine such a
turn is inevitable there, which severely affects Russia's position;
- Reframe the “Russian war against Nazism” to an “international
war to protect the (Christian) Orthodoxy” with a chance to widen the belt of
support for Russia, including inside territories of hostile governments;
- A chance for Serbia's offensive in Kosovo, which could be
a trigger for a broad front of territorial redistribution, when Hungary gets involved
to partition Ukraine, and other countries can start coming to a head against
each other. This will prevent Western countries from focusing specifically on
Russia;
- To divert attention from Ukraine as a victim in the
international arena, creating a point of attention to the Armenian-Azerbaijani
(Orthodox-Islamic) standoff, which could also become a stumbling block for
Europe and Turkey;
- A blow to the positions of the authorities in Yerevan (capital of Armenia), which are considered extremely undesirable for the Kremlin.
Second scenario – a successful unmasking of the preparation of such terrorist attack by our security services. (Attack on an Orthodox church in Armenia, which would be planned by the FSB & then uncovered as the FSB). We don’t consider the Armenian security services to be professional (competent), [as was the assessment of the Ukrainian Armed forces until recently], so such an FSB success inside Armenian territory (“the FSB helped prevent a terrorist attack!”) could indebt Yerevan to Russia in terms of their participation within the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization, consisting of select post-Soviet states). And all the other named objectives, if not as assertively, could be achieved. (By preventing their own terrorist attack rather than actually committing the terrorist attack)
No matter what people think of the FSB, but it’s the FSB that is pursuing the 2nd option (they’d rather be seen as heroes that saved lives in foiling a terrorist attack instead of killing civilians in a terrorist attack). If the 1st option is chosen (by the Kremlin), the practical parts of the plan will be handled by the military rather than the FSB.
Serbia. An option similar to the Armenian one in Serbia has a much smaller chance of any realization, but the risks are disproportionately higher. Almost all of the risks are characterized as unacceptable - there are too many Western secret services and their agents in Serbia, and it is extremely difficult to control the situation on their territory.
Canada. Traditionally, we have looked at Canada as a British sixth-rank without any serious independent weight, but now the situation has unfolded in such a way that classical pressure on the political elites of the West is not working well.
The Western public's mass perception of the war in Ukraine, with unequivocal support for the Ukrainian side, plays too big a role. And this is where Canada, where the Ukrainian lobby is one of the most influential, has become all too important, acting as a tacit center for the dissemination of such opinions.
For many years there has been a myth [the facts point to the unreliability of the story, but for some reason it’s still considered "partly true"] that Canadian special forces had once been deployed near Donetsk against DNR forces, where they were easily destroyed by the National Front fighters. The level of Canadians' preparedness for internal upheaval is also assessed as very low, so this country may be chosen as a target for demonstrative destabilization. I'm not able to provide sufficient answers to the question "why?" just yet, as that's up to the SVR (Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, analogous to the CIA).
(Anatoly) Chubais (high-rank Putin advisor who defected from Russia as a result of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine). I have said before that the risk of such escapes from Russia by top-level representatives was tolerated. After Chubais' emigration, control over everyone will intensify; instead of "soft prevention," very different measures may be taken. Almost all key figures have gone into total silence; who and what they are up to is a surprise even to us. But no one will be allowed to repeat Chubais's defection so easily - they are beginning to guard without fooling around.
Demoralization. The level of demoralization may peak by
mid-April. This especially concerns the military most of all, but everyone else
too. In the meantime (to prevent the demoralization), a search for an extreme
breakthrough solution is considered necessary, that I don’t even know what it
could be.
But it is from this perspective that new fronts [especially if military action is initiated by Serbia] could allow for recalibration. It’s like using a multitude of antidotes for poisonous spider bites: the risk that the antidote will prove more deadly than the poison exists, but still, still, still. I'm not making excuses for the situation – just relaying the observation.
China. To put it mildly, there is no equality in
Moscow-Beijing relations. Beijing is pathologically avoiding any publicity; Any
discussion of “pressure on China” on certain aspects is prohibited. (Russia has
no leverage to pressure China to do anything.)
Provoking China into war with Taiwan stings more than acceptable. (China might make Russia pay for inciting such provocations)
But this is such a desirable outcome (for Russia, that China attacks Taiwan), that it’s unlikely our people will stop trying. China is strongly resisting, and they know how to block information too well (difficult for Kremlin propaganda to penetrate China). The essence of negotiations (between Russia & China about Taiwan) is not known to many.
About Shoigu. An extremely limited number of people know
about his situation, so it's impossible to get reliable information.
In terms of information that could not be concealed - highest
level of threats of assassination attempts on key figures of the (Russian)
state. From covert operatives to attempted point-blank strikes with
high-precision weapons. I would not claim paranoia – everything is possible.
From this perspective, the disappearance of Shoigu and Gerasimov can be explained very simply - unprecedented personal security measures.
Oddities. There are too many strange things about our
prisoners in Ukraine. There is no insight into a number of high-ranking
officers who are missing, but who may be in captivity.
In this case, the question is why hasn’t the Ukrainian side presented such significant trump cards?
There is information that there are psychologists and (agency) recruiters, including foreigners [or rather, they are the core] working on prisoners in Ukraine. (To turn these high-ranking officers against Russia)
It’s impossible to exclude the possibility that a new ROA (Russian Liberation Army – captured Russian soldiers who fought against Stalin) is being formed from the prisoners, and yet it’s impossible to confirm either.
That the captured Russians could form the backbone of regional separatist movements inside Russia is a real threat. Which countries are involved in such an exercise is an open question, as there is too little data.
There is reason to believe that individual countries are preparing "their" regions. The risk zone is too vast: Siberia, Tatarstan, Yakutia, Khabarovsk.
Legal pitfalls. There are two mutually exclusive attitudes: keeping the status-quo of a "special operation" and "preparing a broad involvement of volunteers.”
Hence the mishap: only professional forces can participate
in a special operation (no conscripts).
No one will allow the events to be legally redefined as a
war, but then the "case of the volunteer" hangs in the air.
Minsk will not help with troops, then the CSTO will certainly not help. There is no point in even discussing it at this point.
Kadyrov. Should the FSB need to detain someone in Chechnya
(Hint: Kadyrov), now it’s become completely realistic. And God help those repeating
some threats of issuing “an order to shoot to kill” the guests (Guests would be
the FSB detaining Kadyrov in Chechnya). But we give Kadyrov an "A"
for his informational coverage - a very talented blogger.
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